Kajii and Morris (J. Econ. Theory 1998, 267-276) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two priors to be strategically close. The restrictiveness of these conditions establishes that strategic behavior can be highly sensitive to the assumed prior. Their results thus recommend care in the use of priors in economic modelling. Unfortunately, their proof of a central proposition fails for zero probability types. This comment corrects their proof to account for these cases.
Introduction
In "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Kajii and Morris (KM) make a key contribution to our understanding of these games by showing that a change in priors will have a small effect on equilibrium play precisely when (1) the prior probability of every event changes little and (2) the set on which it becomes nearly common knowledge that posterior beliefs remain close has high measure. These tight requirements for continuity of equilibrium play highlight the importance of verifying the sensitivity of predictions to the assumed prior. KM's results are thus quite important, but their proof of a central proposition fails for zero probability types-and these may matter when multiple priors are considered. I amend the proof to avoid this problem, showing their results to be correct and incidentally tightening them and correcting a minor error in the proof of an earlier lemma. I conclude by suggesting that starting with posteriors rather than priors would ease the analysis.
Correcting their proof
KM consider a static game with I (2 ≤ I < ∞) players, each with a finite action set A i ( a i ) and a countable type set T i ( t i ). The state space is
, where S is a countable space of basic uncertainty. The (common) prior µ is a probability distribution over Ω, and posterior beliefs µ(·|t i ) are defined via Bayes' law when possible and otherwise left unspecified. Player i has the utility function u i : A × Ω → which extends in the usual way to mixed strategies σ i . Un-subscripted variables denote the vector with each player's corresponding variable. The subscript −i has its usual meaning.
implies interim payoffs from a i and t i 's best response are within ε; the term "equilibrium" is shorthand for 0-equilibrium. Beliefs (hence common p-beliefs C p µ and p-evident events) are defined via
With two priors µ and µ , the set of events with "close" posteriors is:
and
The following proposition is central to Kajii and Morris' results:
In their proof of this proposition, KM assert: "[B]y Lemma 4 (with E = C 1−δ µ (A µ,µ (δ))) and ε 1 = ε 2 = δ there exists a 6δM -equilibrium of (µ , u)..." But Lemma 4 may not apply to C 
Applying Lemma 4 here thus requires C
. This may not hold: take a three-state, two-player, three-type (per player) game and two priors µ and µ with µ ((1, 1) The following lemma can be substituted for Lemma 4 in KM's proof of Proposition 5 to make it valid (and tighter).
Lemma 1 If σ is an equilibrium of (µ, u) and u is bounded by
Require that σ = σ on E, and take σ at any other state to be an equilibrium of the restricted game that results from imposing this requirement (as in KM). It remains to show that σ(t i ) is a 5M δ best response for any
for, otherwise, 
Boundedness and (1) show the second sum in (3) to be at least −M δ. For the first sum, note that σ (t i ) = σ(t i ) on E. Since σ is an equilibrium of (µ, u):
where I have used µ(E c |t i ) ≤ 2δ, which follows from equations (1) and (2).
Using (4) and the fact
Hence, the right hand side of equation (3) is no smaller than −5M δ.
Incidentally, in proving Lemma 4, KM claim:
The claim is false, so this proof is also incorrect. To see why, take a two player game with states ω 1 = ((1, 1), 1) and ω 2 = ((1, 2), 2), with µ(
, the left side of their inequality reads:
− 0) = 3M, contradicting their claim. But the lemma is true and can be proved using the reasoning in Lemma 1 above.
Discussion and conclusions
The exposition of the hole in KM's proof highlights a difficulty which can arise in analysis that starts from priors-namely how to deal with the beliefs of zero probability types. KM's definitions suffice for proving their results, but in an earlier version of this paper I showed that the analysis is eased by starting from posteriors. While such an approach raises the question of when and how to introduce a common prior (needed later in KM), the recent literature on the connection between posterior beliefs and the common prior assumption (e.g. Samet (1998) and Feinberg (2000) ) suggests that it is wise to take posteriors as the starting point and introduce a (consistent) prior only when necessary.
